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The Class Analysis of Households Extended: Children, Fathers and Family Budgets
Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff

Introduction
Since the 1994 publication of Bringing It All Back Home, commentators have
raised a variety of questions and criticisms. Subsequently published applications of our
book’s new class theory of households, by ourselves and others, have raised new issues
not foreseen when we first developed the theory. In this paper we will address the major
points of these reactions in ways that extend the class analysis of households well beyond
our book and the literature it provoked and informed. The following topic areas will
sequentially structure our presentation: children, interactions between the class structures
of households and of enterprises, the class complexity of the household budget, class
contradictions between households and enterprises, fathers’ household labor, and when
children become household serfs. A short addendum addresses households from which
class is absent because production there has dwindled and only consumption remains.
Analyzing these new topics broadens and deepens two central points of our 1994
work. First, by conceiving class processes and contradictions and struggles over class as
components of households, we can explore how class directly affects all the other, nonclass dimensions of those households: affective, marital, political, sexual, parental,
financial, and so forth. We can show in particular how the class structure of households
influences in contradictory ways (1) parents’ rearing of children, (2) household budgets,
and (3) father’s household labor. Our analysis demonstrates and underscores how the
good and bad of family life are intimately connected to class. Second, we will further
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develop or analysis of the interaction between household and enterprise class structures.
Here we will stress how individuals are shaped by class processes, contradictions, and
conflicts not only on the job but also and differently at home. Marxian analyses need to
recognize this differential shaping to understand better the complexity of individual
behavior including, as we will emphasize, its contradictory nature.
Children
How are we to understand children in relation to the class processes we have
identified and explored inside as well as outside the modern household?1 In other words,
how do children fit within our framework that defines class in terms of processes of
producing, appropriating, and distributing surplus labor or its (surplus) products?
Depending on their age and other social factors including child labor laws,
kinship traditions, religious customs, industrialization, and technical skills, children’s
labor power may be sold (by themselves, parents, or others) to employers outside their
households. Their sustenance would then derive from the portion of the wages paid for
their labor power that the children actually used for consumption. For example, Marx’s
Capital repeatedly pays attention to the factory labor of children in the rapidly developing
capitalism of his day. Engels too described their horrifying conditions, pertinent today not
only because children still comprise significant parts of capitalism’s global labor force,
but also as a reminder of capitalism’s cruelty to its more vulnerable populations (1968).
Historically, one source of children’s subsistence has been value flows received for their
labor power through market exchanges with their capitalist employers. Moreover, such
children have performed as both productive and unproductive laborers according to the
specific requirements of capitalist employers and the social conditions of their
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employment. The class analysis of adult wage-earners applies and has been applied to
children who occupy parallel positions in relation to capitalist enterprises. Here, however,
our focus is on analyzing children whose labor power is not sold to capitalists.
Unlike adults, children rarely function as employers of others, adults or children.
Because of their infrequent service on industrial corporate boards of directors or as
surplus appropriators in smaller, unincorporated industrial enterprises, we do not analyze
such possibilities here. However, a brief mention is warranted for children who live by
owning property used in capitalist class structures. If they have received gifts or
inheritances of property – such as land leased to capitalists, money lent to them, securities
representing ownership of capitalists’ means of production, etc. - children can live from
the resulting payments (rents, interest, dividends, etc.) paid by capitalists for their access
to such property.2
We turn our analysis then toward the mass of children whose connections to the
capitalist class structures of most enterprises in modern economies are not those of wageearners or property owners. Rather, these are the children who live within and depend
upon households whose internal production relations are characterized, as per our earlier
work (1994), by feudal and other non-capitalist class structures. Our tasks here are to
show, first, how children survive and grow by consuming portions of the goods and
services produced within those non-capitalist class structures, and second, how the arrival
of children impacts both the non-capitalist class structures inside the household and the
capitalist class structures outside. Achieving these tasks will, we believe, yield a class
analysis of the mass of children who are not wage-earners or property owners.
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We assume, to start simply, that the husband alone sells his labor power outside
the household for a wage, a value received in exchange for his labor power. Later in the
argument we shall assume that the wife also sells her labor power externally. Suppose
they have a child. The survival and growth of the child - at least to some minimum age depends in part on its care including a flow of goods and services that the child
consumes. In so far as these goods and services have values – in the sense of embodying
quantities of socially necessary abstract labor time - we can conceive of childcare in
value terms.3
Our class analysis of children will also provisionally assume a household in which
the feudal class process connects husband and wife. Thus, the wife performs necessary
labor – whose fruits she consumes to sustain herself – and also surplus labor whose fruits
are appropriated by her husband. She is “exploited” in the precise sense that someone
other than herself immediately appropriates the surplus portion of her labor (or its fruits).4
The class process here – the production and (exploitative) appropriation of the surplus –
takes a feudal form since it occurs within a personal bond (marriage) relation rather than
a contract (wage/market) relation or a slave (ownership) relation. The wife performs
necessary household labor in such concrete forms as cooking, shopping, cleaning, and
repairing whose products she consumes. She also performs surplus labor which may take
the same concrete forms yielding products appropriated by her husband or else her
surplus labor may produce a different set of concrete goods and services. For example,
before a child arrives into such a feudal class-structured household, the wife may have
performed surplus labor yielding cooked meals, washed clothes, cleaned space, and
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repaired furniture, while afterward, part or all of her surplus labor may take the concrete
form of child care.5
In any case, it is the husband (qua feudal lord) who appropriates her surplus labor
(qua feudal serf) in the particular concrete forms shaped by the internal and external
conditions of their household. Our analysis of a child’s arrival into such a feudal
household begins by provisionally assuming that nothing else changes in that household.
The wife, we will further assume, has been socially conditioned to respond to the child’s
needs for household goods and services (food, clothing, shelter, cleaning, etc.) by
devoting time to producing or otherwise securing them. Thus, in addition to the necessary
labor she performs for her own sustenance and the surplus labor she performs to provide
specific goods and services to her feudal husband, she must now do additional labor,
namely child care. Since she does not consume the fruits of such additional labor, this
additional labor represents her increased exploitation within the household’s feudal class
structure. The more children, the greater her additional exploitation if nothing else in the
household class structure changes. In effect, the wife is delivering more surplus labor to
her husband in the concrete form of child care.
Such increased exploitation of the wife-become-mother underscores the
pertinence of the cultural, political, and emotional pressures in her social context that
make her provide childcare as additional surplus labor. Her socially conditioned selfdefinition comes into play alongside those of her husband, relatives, and friends to shape
her conceptions of and attitudes toward child care. Whether undertaken with happiness
and eagerness or merely acquiescence or even resentment, the additional exploitation will
affect her and her relationships. The nature of those affects will depend partly but only
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partly on whether she is conscious of her exploitation or not. Indeed, her continued
exploitation may well require that she be unconscious of it and perhaps of the very
concept of exploitation per se. For example, extending our argument (Fraad, Resnick and
Wolff 1994) that specific concepts of love operated to sustain feudal class structures in
US households, child care too may be conceptualized as a matter of parental love having
no relationship to class or exploitation.
While the impact of children arriving in feudal households may entail the
increased exploitation of the wife, that is not necessarily the case. Consider some simple
value equations. Dividing the wife’s day into laboring and non-laboring portions, she has
twenty-four hours to allocate among her feudal necessary labor time – NL (F) – her
feudal surplus labor time – SL (F) – and a residual time – R. The R term refers in the
broadest sense to the time she spends sleeping, eating, contemplating, playing, and so
forth. Her twenty-four hour time equation may thus be expressed as follows:
1.

24 = NL (F) + SL (F) + R.

We can measure the products of her necessary and surplus labor [NL (F) + SL (F)] in
terms of the socially necessary abstract labor time embodied in them. In so doing, we
borrow and extend Marx’s notion of the labor time embodied in products as constituting
their “values”. Thus, the wife adds a total value by her labor inside the household that
equals NL(F) + SL(F); we refer to the value added by the wife, since the total value of
the outputs of her household labor also contain the values of the tools, equipment, and
raw materials used up in and by her household production. She receives back and
consumes only NL (F) worth of the household goods and services that she produces. She
delivers SL (F) to her husband, as labor or as the products of such labor. The value that
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her household labor adds thus exceeds the value of the household products she consumes
to reproduce her household labor power. Because the first receiver (i.e., appropriator) of
the wife’s surplus labor - SL (F) – is not she herself but another and different person, her
husband, he is therefore what Marx refers to/defines as an exploiter. In this instance, he is
an exploiter within the feudal class structure of the household.
Using these simple equations, let us reconsider the impact of a child added to such
a feudal class-structured household. If we assume no change in the wife’s necessary
household labor or in her consumption of its fruits, then sustaining children would require
either of two household adjustments or possibly some combination of them. In the first
sort of adjustment, the wife performs more surplus labor, SL (F), so as to deliver care to
the child. In the second sort of adjustment, her SL (F) remains unchanged, but one
portion of it stops taking the concrete forms it took before children (e.g., cooking,
cleaning, etc for the husband’s consumption) and instead shifts to the concrete forms of
child care.
The first adjustment was what we assumed initially in this discussion of children:
their arrival increases the feudal wife’s rate of exploitation (SL (F)/NL (F)). This
adjustment requires that she reduce her R. Thus, rising exploitation and fewer hours
sleeping, eating, or merely finding a peaceful moment during the day to rest her body and
mind are among the costs she incurs in this adjustment of the feudal household to the
arrival of children. The adjustment may occur consciously or unconsciously, as the result
of the husband’s dictates to his wife or as the parents’ cooperative execution of social
norms they have both respectfully internalized.
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The fundamental class dimensions of the household refer to the production and
appropriation of the household surplus labor. Hence we focus here on the provision of
child care within the class structure of the husband-wife relation and do not pursue the
impact on the children of their consumption of a portion of the household’s output of
goods and services. We use the term “gift” to underscore that child care (the value flow
of household labor and products to children) is not itself a part of a class process. It is a
non-class process (as are, for example, loans among workers, gifts to elderly parents, etc.)
that interacts with and affects class processes but is different from them. In our discussion
above, the child does not perform, appropriate, distribute, or receive a distributed share of
the surplus. The wife produces and the husband appropriates all her surplus. When the
child arrives, she produces more surplus which takes the form of goods and services that
are then gifted to the child.
To accommodate the arrival of children, the delivery to them of goods and
services has been undertaken in the household by means of this first possible adjustment
of its feudal class structure. Of course, the social context will overdetermine whether,
when and how children arrive and whether and how goods and services will be delivered
for their care. To the extent that this first adjustment is replicated with the arrival of more
children, then the greater will be the mother’s exploitation and the reduction of her R.
Because we think very many US women still live and work within feudal households
with children, it is often such increased feudal class exploitation that sustains those
children. Similarly, when that increased exploitation undercuts mothers’ ability or
willingness to perform more household labor (or to stay married), such household feudal
class structures (and the marriages that began them) could be undermined.
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A second and different adjustment of the household feudal class structure to the
arrival of children is also possible. For various reasons, including wives/mothers refusing
greater exploitation and reduced R, the value flow for child care may occur without the
increased exploitation of wives/mothers. In this case and again referring to our simple
equation, a child’s arrival and the consequent flow of value in the form of child care does
not entail increased exploitation of the wife within the household’s feudal class structure
– no increase in SL (F) nor any reduction of her R. If we further assume that no change
occurs either in her NL (F) – that she continues to produce and consume the same value
of her household production of goods and services – then the child care must involve a
change within the SL (F). That is, a portion of the wife’s pre-child surplus labor that took
the form of, say, cleaning, cooking, providing sexual services, etc. for the husband, will
be switched after the child arrives to performing child care.6 Instead of the latter requiring
increased exploitation of the wife, it is rather that she alters the kinds of labor (and hence
the mix of products) that comprise the feudal wife’s unchanged quantity of surplus labor
provided. The larger social context will determine whether husbands are persuaded
and/or pressured to arrange or accept this second possible adjustment of a feudal class
structured household to the arrival of children. As with the first adjustment, the second
may be undertaken consciously or unconsciously; the existence of alternative possible
adjustments may or may not be recognized by either partner.
Still other adjustments are also possible. For example, assuming no change in the
wife’s division of her day into NL (F), SL (F), and R, another way for child care to occur
could entail the wife no longer consuming all the products of her necessary household
labor. She reduces her own consumption to provide child care. Of course, to the extent
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that such a value flow would jeopardize the reproduction of the wife’s serf labor power, it
would undermine the feudal class structure of the household.
Yet another possible adjustment to the child’s arrival in a feudal household may
be that the father undertakes some childcare labor alongside his wife or instead of her
doing such labor. While we examine below possible class and non-class consequences
arising from father’s added household labor, we can say here that were father’s labor to
produce some or all of the child care required by the arrival of the child, it could
correspondingly relieve at least some of the disruptive pressures of the other possible
adjustments to the child’s arrival. In this way, the father’s performance of childcare labor
might not only sustain the child but also reinforce the feudal class structure of the
household.
For completeness, we need finally to consider yet another possible adjustment of
the feudal class-structured household to a child’s arrival. A rise in the productivity of the
wife’s labor (for example, by providing her with improved tools, appliances, etc.) may
occur. Then, during the same number of hours of labor, wives may be able to produce a
larger quantity of goods and services. To the extent that increased productivity provided
the goods and services for child care, the other adjustments described above could be less
difficult for and less disruptive of the household’s feudal class structure. Of course, since
improving household labor productivity typically involves and results from buying
appliances, it requires outlays from the husband’s cash income from work outside the
household. That would set in motion other problems for the household considered below
in our discussion of household budgets. Finally, if their increased productivity results in
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wives spending fewer hours on products they consume and more on those delivered to
their husbands, then the result would be an increased rate of feudal wives’ exploitation.
The most likely adjustments of feudal class structured households to children’s
arrival will be those that reflect the customs, laws, and religions dominant in the US
today (shaping, for example, the emotional needs, expectations, and taboos of wives and
husbands). Thus, while productivity increases and childcare labor by fathers are possible,
those adjustments, when they have occurred, seem rarely to have sufficed. Caring for
children arriving in contemporary feudal households continues to depend on various
combinations of increases in women’s surplus labor (rising rates of household
exploitation), reductions in their own consumption levels, and decreases in their nonlaboring time (R) within their households.7
These consequences for mothers risk their mental and physical exhaustion and
their alienation from their children, their husbands, and even from the family as a socially
celebrated institution. To the extent that wives (and also husbands) lack any
consciousness that their children’s arrival has complicated and strained the household’s
feudal class structure, they will lack the concepts and vocabulary to address the class
aspects of their problems. Hence they will be less likely to change their households’ class
structures, even though those very structures contribute to the tensions they otherwise
experience. Instead, spouses will more likely blame each other and/or the children for the
alienation, exhaustion, and interpersonal ambivalences that so often follow children’s
arrival. Continuing the tragedy, when those children reach adulthood they too will more
likely blame their parents, ignore class, and so perpetuate the situation generationally.
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Children thus impose particular personal costs on mothers and fathers living
inside households with feudal class structures – alongside the opportunities they also
present for parents to nurture, care, and both love and be loved by them. Mothers
especially are generally expected to absorb those costs willingly. If they are not conscious
of their rising feudal exploitation and its effects on the rest of the family and thus on the
larger society too, that does not diminish its impact. Thus it not surprising those children
at home are often victimized emotionally and physically by mothers and fathers who are
themselves physically and emotionally stressed by the overwork they often recognize and
the class exploitation they rarely do. In addition, children’s arrival into a feudal
household class structure also puts complex new demands and hence strains on its
monetary arrangements. Feudal households must always balance the money inflows from
the external sale of husbands’ and wives’ labor powers with the monetary outflows
needed to reproduce not only the labor powers they each sell but also the household’s
internal feudal class structure. Children’s arrival places new demands on that balancing
process and thereby affects households and families in yet more ways. Thus we turn next
to households and money.

Class interactions between households and enterprises
One consequence of recognizing households’ distinctive class structures is that
social theory has a new and no longer avoidable task. Grasping any society’s dynamic
henceforth requires taking account of the interactions between class structures inside
households and those outside, e.g. in enterprises (Gibson-Graham 1996 particularly ch.9).
Understanding individuals and groups likewise now requires exploring how the multiple
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class structures that their lives engage, at home and at work, interact to shape their
experiences, interrelationships, and consciousness. Individuals participate in different
class structures, within their lifetimes and often within each day. Goods and services flow
among these different class structures. The multiple class structures of any society are
thus complexly interdependent. Changes in any one class structure will change the others
and the interactions among them. Class changes will in turn alter all the non-class
structures and processes that comprise the social context of class. When children are
introduced into the household’s class structure, its resulting changes ramify socially.
While various literatures explore other aspects of the complex relations between
households and enterprises, all are virtually silent about how the production,
appropriation, and distributions of surpluses occur differently in households and
enterprises. They do not investigate why, when, and how surpluses flow between the
class structures of household and enterprise, nor do they follow the social consequences
of those flows. Thus, the contradictions besetting the class structures of households and
enterprises and the relationship between them remain largely unrecognized in the
contemporary families who struggle to manage those contradictions and their effects. Our
goals here are to add class-qua-surplus analyses of households and enterprises to the
existing literatures and to extend class consciousness generally.
Every class structure requires preconditions if it is to begin and ongoing
conditions of existence if it is to be reproduced over time. As preconditions for any
particular class structure to occur in a society’s production activities, we may mention (1)
that the requisite tools, equipment, and raw materials must be made available to
commence such production, and (2) that laborers must be willing, able, and interested in
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beginning to produce and deliver a surplus to the appropriators in that particular class
structure. As ongoing conditions of existence of any particular class structure, used up
means of production must be replenished and laborers must continue to produce and
deliver surpluses to its appropriators. Additional ongoing conditions of existence include
that the produced surplus must be quantitatively sufficient to enable its appropriators to
distribute portions sufficient to secure all those conditions of the class structure’s
reproduction that would not otherwise be secured. And finally, the surplus must either
take – or be easily changed into – the qualitative form(s) needed to secure those
conditions. That is, the surplus must be distributed in a form acceptable to those
recipients who provide the needed conditions of the class structure’s reproduction. In
more formal theoretical terms, the class structure’s commencement and reproduction
require that its preconditions and then its ongoing conditions be realized.
Once any particular class structure’s preconditions have been realized and it
comes into existence, its reproduction is threatened if and when any of its ongoing
conditions of existence is withdrawn. For example, if, within any class structure, its
productive workers refuse to continue to produce surpluses or to deliver them to the
surplus appropriators, then that class structure’s continued existence is rendered
problematical. If the tools, equipment, and raw material used up in production are not
replenished, that will also jeopardize the class structure. Similar jeopardy would attach to
a class structure if the appropriators lack sufficient surplus to distribute the requisite
portions to secure its conditions of existence. Finally, to take another example especially
germane to the rest of this discussion, if a class structure generates a surplus that is
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qualitatively unacceptable to its intended recipients, then that class structure is
threatened.
This last is precisely the existential dilemma of the feudal class structures of
households when they are located within today’s highly monetized societies. The
household’s feudal class structure typically has several conditions of existence that can be
secured only with money disbursements, yet the wife inside the household produces and
delivers to her husband a surplus that is usually in-kind rather than in monetary form.
These money disbursements pose a basic problem which has to be solved for the feudal
class structure of the household to survive within a monetized, capitalist enterprise
economy. For example, the wife’s feudal surplus labor requires a physical space in which
to work; the family home is a condition of existence of the feudal class structure within it.
To secure the family home, the husband and wife perhaps undertake a mortgage loan that
requires money payments to the mortgage lender out of the household’s feudal surplus.
Alternatively, they may rent the living space that enables their household’s feudal class
structure. Obliged then to make rental payments – necessarily in money form – they face
the problem that their household surplus does not take the requisite money form. Other
examples include possible taxes levied on the feudal households and interest payments on
loans to the household.
Even before the problem arose of money payments needed to secure certain of the
feudal household’s ongoing conditions of existence, there were the money payments
needed to secure the preconditions of the feudal household’s coming into existence. That
is, money was typically needed to make initial purchases of the tools, equipment, and raw
materials to begin a feudal household (and then, of course, to replenish them regularly
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thereafter). In sum, feudal households, both to begin and to continue, must make a variety
of money payments.
However, one distinction that differentiates the feudal household from the
industrial capitalist enterprise is that while the latter’s class structure is usually fully
monetized, inside the feudal household produced goods and services rarely take a
monetary form. Thus the problem for the existing feudal class structures inside
households – if they are to coexist with capitalist enterprises outside – is that they must
make money payments while they do not generate money incomes.8 The general solution
typical in modern societies has been to work out household budgets that co-mingle
monetized and non-monetized components from both class structures, the feudal inside
the household and the capitalist outside. Yet, like all solutions, the budgetary solution is
contradictory as it generates new problems and tensions even as it resolves old ones.
To explore the household budget and the feudal/capitalist class structures it
encompasses, we make some simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the husband
is the only household member who earns money income from outside the household. Our
argument can easily be extended below to accommodate today’s more usual situation
where wives also do wage work outside the household. Second, and also only for
simplicity, we assume the husband sells his labor power to an industrial capitalist. Our
argument could be modified for any other mode of earning money outside the household.
Given these simplifying assumptions, it follows that the husband’s money wages must be
the source for those monetary payments required to secure the conditions of existence of
the feudal class structure of his household.
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The husband’s money wages flow into the household’s composite budget. A
portion of those money wages then flows out as expenditures to purchase the tools,
equipment, and raw materials that replenish, upgrade, or supplement those used up in
household production and to secure those ongoing conditions of existence of its feudal
class structure that require money payments. In effect, the household budget
accomplishes a transfer of money from the husband’s participation in the capitalist
enterprise to the reproduction of its feudal class structure. The problem of the qualitative
form (non-monetary) of the feudal household’s surplus has been solved by this budgetary
transfer. In this way, the household budget effectively encompasses and integrates the
feudal and capitalist class participations of household members.
However, this budgetary transfer solution raises new problems of its own. In the
simple feudal household we have assumed, the transfer diverts a portion of the husband’s
wage income to reproduce the household’s feudal class structure. The question thus
arises: how does this wage diversion affect the husband? Our answer draws on Marx’s
classic definition of the value of labor power as equal to the sum of values of the
commodities workers customarily demand to reproduce their labor power. Like Marx, we
assume, for expository simplicity, that the wages employers pay for the labor power they
buy from workers equals the value of that labor power. Thus, diverting a portion of the
father’s wages to secure his feudal household will prevent him from buying and
consuming the full set of commodities customarily needed to reproduce the labor power
he sells to his employer. This is a problem for the capitalist enterprise that employs him
because a husband’s reduced consumption may jeopardize his continued productivity and
hence employability (because of deteriorated physical, psychological, and/or emotional
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well-being). The husband’s reduced consumption also presents risks to the household,
since if he consequently lost his job in the capitalist enterprise, that would undermine the
household budget and hence the household altogether. If children were added to the
feudal household, likely requiring still more monetary payments to secure their places
within the household class structure, further pressures for diverting the husband’s wages
might well ensue and thus cause further problems for both class structures.
The general response to the problems raised by the transfer of some of the
husband’s wages to securing the household’s feudal class structure has been to
compensate him by diverting to his consumption a portion of the feudal household
surplus. This compensation entails a reverse transfer. In the first transfer, money wages
from the father’s participation in the capitalist class structure of the enterprise are
transferred to reproduce the household’s feudal class structure. In the compensating
reverse transfer, a portion of the feudal household’s surplus labor, embodied in nonmonetized goods and services, is consumed by the father to reproduce the labor power he
sells to the capitalist employer. One transfer reproduces the household’s members’
participation in its internal feudal class structure, while the other reproduces the
household’s members’ participation in an external capitalist class structure.
These internal transfers of the household budget make it one site of the class
contradictions in the relation between household and enterprise in many contemporary
societies. Husband and wife will not always agree on which household conditions of
existence require monetary payments, how large each of such payments should be, when
the payments should be made, etc. They may dispute the portion of the husband’s wages
to be used to purchase commodities for the reproduction of his labor power or the portion
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of the household surplus to be provided for the husband’s consumption. Husband and
wife have different relations to and dependencies upon the two opposing transfers within
the household budget. The differences and tensions resulting from these contradictions
can aggravate, disrupt, and even fragment households. The arrival of children and
possibly other adults into such households will further complicate and perhaps aggravate
their contradictions and tensions.
If the lives of the wife and children revolve mostly around the feudal household,
they may well favor its well-being by supporting a household budget that transfers more
of the husband’s wages away from expenditures to reproduce his labor power. If the
husband, whose life is split between two class structures, is more invested for cultural
reasons in his capitalist employment, he may well resent the deflected wages and view
household budget priorities very differently. The husband who seeks more surplus labor
from his wife to compensate for the wages he uses to support the feudal household may
find her resistant. Children may enhance her resistance and eventually weigh in on her
side of such conflicts with the husband. In short, household budgeting is replete with
class dimensions and contradictions.
The husband must reproduce his labor power to be able to sell it again and thus
ensure his income and his social position. He uses his wages to do that. He has certain
conscious or unconscious ambivalences about marriage and household and children. He
is culturally disposed, in most circumstances, to want them, yet he also senses the
difficulties their sustenance will provoke for him as they likely did in his family of origin.
The feudal wife is more intimately connected to the household’s maintenance and likely,
again for cultural reasons, to appreciate its importance for the family more than the
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husband does. The children developing inside such class-conflicted households will
exhibit all manner of complex responses to how each parent struggles in and with those
conflicts. The children’s responses will, in turn, shape their own later adult engagements
with the class contradictions connecting their households and enterprises. Just as those
class contradictions shape the personal interactions and relationships between husband
and wife, they do likewise, albeit in different ways, for the children growing up in such
households.
Negotiations among family members may achieve some at least temporary
compromise regarding monetized feudal subsumed class payments and the
accommodating transfers within the household budget. However, changes within the two
class structures as well as non-class changes affecting household members undermine
and disrupt such compromises. The class contradictions of contemporary households
constantly shape their trials and tribulations and their lasting impacts on all its members.
Class contradictions thus ramify their effects across the social landscape. Because those
effects include serious social costs, we presume that rendering the class contradictions
visible and explicit will give modern society a better chance to deal with if not reduce
those costs. Our household class analysis provokes especially this new question about
contemporary household-enterprise interactions and their social effects: what sorts of
class changes in both households and enterprises might yield preferable social results?

Class complexities of the household budget
To further unpack the mutual dependency between the class structures of feudal
household and capitalist enterprise, and to set the stage for much of the rest of this paper,
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we propose a simple value analysis of the flows between them. To summarize our
argument so far, namely that the husbands in our simplified narrative have one foot in
(enterprise) capitalism and another in (household) feudalism, we offer a simple
inequality. Inequality 2 below slightly modifies Marx’s similar formulation for the value
of labor power in Capital, Vol. 1. It does this by taking into account the fact that the value
of labor power received by the husband - V (CAP) – does not suffice for both the
reproduction of his labor power and the monetized payments required to secure the
conditions of existence of his feudal household.
2.

V (CAP) < Cc (CAP) + YHB

Here, V (CAP) stands for the value of the husband’s labor power sold to the capitalist
enterprise (presumed to equal his money wage). These wages are understood to flow into
the household budget as its monetized income. Following Marx, V (CAP) is defined as
equal to the value of all the commodities he must customarily purchase and consume to
reproduce his labor power (i.e., V (CAP) = EV/UV x UV where EV/UV stands for the
unit value of each customarily consumed commodity and UV stands for the entire bundle
of such commodities). Let us define Cc (CAP) as this value the husband must spend on
such customarily consumed commodities to reproduce his labor power: Cc (CAP) ≡
EV/UV x UV. Finally, YHB stands for the portion of the husband’s wages diverted away
from commodity purchases for his own consumption and used instead to (1) purchase
tools, equipment, and raw materials (appliances, children’s’ clothing and toys, raw food,
etc.) to replenish those used up in the wife’s household production, and (2) secure certain
conditions of existence of the household’s feudal class structure (rent, insurance
premiums, and property taxes on the feudal home; donations to the church; expenditures
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on childcare such as children’s clothing, diapers, carriages, cribs, toys, and baby-food,
etc).9 As in all of the following equations and inequalities, the variables here are
measurable in the usual “value” (i.e., socially necessary abstract labor) terms.
Clearly, if YHB were zero – for example, an unmarried male wage-earner living
alone who spends all his wages on commodities for his personal consumption – then
V (CAP) = Cc (CAP). Likewise, if YHB > 0, then only part of the husband’s wage is
available to purchase only part of the commodities he needs to consume to reproduce his
labor power.
The inequality sign in expression 2 above follows from Marx’s value assumption,
namely that the value of labor power equals the abstract labor necessary to produce the
bundle of commodities (EV/UV x UV) whose consumption will just reproduce the
husband’s labor power. Thus, once the wage-earner uses some part of his wages for
purposes other than buying commodities to reproduce his labor power, Marx’s equation
converts into the inequality of expression 2.10 If wages equal the value of the husband’s
labor power, then they cannot pay for both the reproduction of his labor power and the
payments included in the YHB term that reproduce the household’s feudal class
structure.11 Using any portion of the husband’s money wages for the reproduction of the
household’s feudal class structure (i.e., YHB > 0) reduces the commodities he can buy and
consume, and that threatens the reproduction of his labor power.12
In many countries, most male wage laborers live in households whose budgets use
portions of their wages to secure conditions of existence of those households’ feudal class
structures. Such household budgets thereby threaten capitalism. Indeed, the more
pressing become the financial demands to support feudal households, including raising
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children there, the stronger this threat becomes.13 Yet the husband whose participation in
the capitalist class structure is threatened in this way is also the “head” of the household,
the appropriator of the feudal surplus produced within it. He is, in short, torn between the
contending demands and rewards of his positions within the two class structures that his
life engages. The need to purchase commodities to reproduce his labor power contradicts
the need to fund his household, to “support his family” there. Moreover, this
contradictory tension in the husband is no doubt communicated to and shared by wife and
children; indeed it becomes woven into the culture of the larger society. We suspect that
the demands of family and children today, as compared, say, to Marx’s day, tip the
balance such that now relatively more of the husband’s wages are diverted to securing the
feudal household.
This change in household budgeting arose alongside the historical development of
a new world-view of the family and children. Modern capitalism is increasingly viewed
as resting ultimately on the strength of “an underlying family structure.” More than
before, children are conceived of and treated as cherished wards there. Earlier
capitalism’s harsh treatment of children (so aptly described by Engels) contributed to this
evolution. New discourses arose that not only documented abuses, but also produced
children as new objects of social – legal, medical, economic, and above all family –
concern and need. Sensitivities changed as well, thereby helping to instill in wageearners a propensity to spend relatively more on family and childcare at the expense of
commodities for personal consumption.14 Capitalism’s abuse of children in many “less
developed countries” today evokes similar sentiments and reform movements aimed, at
least in part, to “strengthen families and households.”
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However, the household’s reproduction requires a balanced coexistence of its
various members’ participations in both feudal and capitalist class structures. The threat
to the husband’s reproduction of his labor power must somehow be compensated or
offset. Otherwise a threatened capitalism will react back and threaten the household as
well (for example, by dismissing male workers whose productivity falls as a result of
their not adequately reproducing their labor power). As we shall show, the husband’s
threatened labor power reproduction is partly offset by reorganizing the household’s
internal feudal class structure to provide more of its output for the husband’s personal
consumption.
We begin our demonstration of this argument by introducing inequality 3 to
represent the household feudal class structure in value terms.
3.

SL (F)NM + NCRM > SSCP (F)NM + SSCP (F)M

SL (F)NM is the feudal household surplus labor (in “value” terms measured in abstract
labor time) that husbands appropriate from their wives; the subscript NM indicates that
this value takes a non-monetary form. NCRM represents the transfer of value (a “nonclass revenue” or NCR since it is neither a surplus appropriated nor one distributed) to
the feudal household resulting from the diversion of a portion of the husband’s wages; the
subscript M indicates that this value flow has a monetary form.15 On the right hand side
of inequality 3, we have disaggregated the household’s feudal subsumed class payments,
i.e. its outlays to secure the conditions of existence of its internal feudal class structure.16
One portion, SSCP (F)NM, stands for those feudal subsumed class distributions that take a
non-monetary form. The remaining portion, SSCP (F)M represents those subsumed class
distributions that must be made in cash. As argued above, in most modern societies, this
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latter portion is substantial and may well exceed the former. The inequality results
because the husband transfers a portion of the monetized value he received from
capitalist employment into the feudal household to finance its feudal cash requirements.
This inflow of value from capitalism to the feudal household enables household revenues
to exceed required expenditures.
Inequality 3 shows how the functioning of the feudal household depends partly on
capitalism, specifically the diversion of husband’s wages partly to sustain his household’s
feudal class structure. We show next how this very dependence yields a return flow of
value to help reproduce the husband’s labor power. This return flow is accomplished
when the husband acquires for his own consumption a portion of his wife’s feudal surplus
labor inside the household. That consumption helps to reproduce his labor power; it
compensates for the diversion of his wages within the household budget. The household
budget has thus accomplished two value transfers: (1) the diversion of wages derived
from a capitalist class structure (enterprise) for expenditures to support a feudal class
structure (household) and (2) the diversion of a portion of the surplus in the feudal class
structure (household) to help reproduce the labor power sold to a capitalist class structure
(enterprise).
While unlikely, it is possible that the two opposing value transfers are exactly
equal. We may express such an equality viewed from the vantage point of the feudal
household as equation 4:
4.

SL (F)NM + NCRM = SSCP (F)NM + SSCP (F)M + YNM

The newly introduced variable, YNM, represents the non-monetized portion of the wife’s
feudal surplus labor diverted to help reproduce the husband’s labor power. This diversion
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diminishes what remains of the wife’s feudal surplus available to secure household
feudalism’s conditions of existence (i.e., SSCP (F)NM). The equal sign in Equation 4
signals that what the household’s reproduction suffers by providing YNM for the
husband’s personal consumption is exactly offset by what the husband suffers by
providing NCRM for the household’s reproduction at the expense of reproducing his own
labor power.
Equation 5 shows the same result considered from the vantage point of the
husband as wage laborer:
5.

V (CAP) - YHB + YNM = Ĉc (CAP) + CH

On the equation’s left hand side is the husband’s money wage income, V (CAP), minus
the portion of his money wage diverted to the budget for securing the feudal household’s
reproduction, YHB, plus the portion of value transferred to his personal consumption from
the feudal household, YNM. On the right hand side is the husband’s new level of
consumption: the value of commodities he can actually buy with the portion of his wages
not diverted to reproduce the household’s feudal class structure, Ĉc (CAP), plus the
portion of his wife’s feudal surplus labor (non-monetized) diverted for his personal
consumption to reproduce his labor power, CH. Assuming, as we have, that this value
inflow, YNM, equals the value outflow, YHB, then what the husband suffers by the reduced
purchase of commodities, Ĉc (CAP), is exactly balanced by what he gains in feudal
household consumption, CH.
Class contradictions between households and enterprises
Equations 4 and 5 allow us to pinpoint the tensions surrounding the household’s
attempt to integrate external capitalist wage labor and internal feudal production. To the
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degree that the value transferred from feudal household surplus to the husband’s
reproduction of his labor power, YNM, is less than YHB (the reverse transfer of the
husband’s wages to reproduce the household’s feudal class structure), the husband’s total
consumption falls. Tensions then may arise among husbands, wives, and children over
supporting the household versus reproducing the husband’s labor power. Needless to say,
were YNM instead greater than YHB tensions might well arise provoked by wives and
children whose household lives were pinched by such an inequality (the rise in the
husband’s total consumption). Indeed, with or without consciousness that these transfers
occur, household members’ conceptions and measurements of household circumstances
may well clash. Then, too, changes inside the household’s feudal class structure or inside
the enterprise’s capitalist class structure will convert these equations into inequalities
provoking further tensions. One way the household might try to ameliorate all such
tensions would be through raising the wife’s productivity: purchasing more efficient tools
and equipment to enable more household output from the same labor time. However, as
noted earlier, raising household productivity has its own limits and contradictions; it
offers no guarantees that it can reduce households’ class tensions.
Equation 5 can also clarify the alternative household reactions if and when
changes occur in either the feudal or the capitalist class structures that the household
engages. As one example, we may consider possible consequences if the husband’s wage
falls. One possibility is that he simply accepts reduced personal consumption: he buys
fewer commodities and nothing else in the household budget changes. Of course, such a
consequence undermines the labor power he offers for sale to capitalists and also reduces
the wage-earner’s demand for capitalist commodities: in short, problems for the
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reproduction of the capitalist class structure ensue. A second possible consequence of the
husband’s falling wages is that he may demand or command a larger YNM to offset his
diminished wage. If all else remains the same, the wife must perform more surplus labor
(in equation 4) and deliver its fruits to her husband for his personal consumption (CH in
equation 5). Increased household exploitation is then the “compensation” for the
husband’s fallen wages, but it will also provoke all manner of problems for the household
with spill-over effects on the husband at work. A third possibility is that the wife will not
perform additional surplus labor in the household to enhance the husband’s personal
consumption; rather she may reduce some kinds of the surplus labor done before the
husband’s wages fell (e.g., child care) and substitute instead other kinds (e.g., personal
services for the husband). In such cases, children’s vulnerability to their households’
efforts to integrate their feudal and capitalist class engagements/dependencies may be
abused. Beyond these illustrative examples, there are, of course, many other external
changes that can and do impact such households, just as there are other possible
household reactions to such changes
Equations 4 and 5 can also serve as frameworks for examining how other sorts of
changes can affect the contradictory relationship between household feudalism and
enterprise capitalism. For example, if the husband reduced the portion of his money
wages made available to reproduce his household’s feudal class structure and/or if the
household’s reproduction suddenly became more expensive (higher home maintenance
costs, property taxes, children’s school fees, etc.) the household’s feudal class structure
would be jeopardized. Without one or another compensating adjustment in the terms of
Equation 4, the household might dissolve or disperse and thereby set in motion secondary
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consequences for capitalist enterprises. For example, rising household costs may lead the
wife to sell her labor power to a capitalist employer as well (“to solve the family’s
financial problems”). However, that decision will also generate new problems. Will such
a wife simply add her wage labor outside the household to the necessary and surplus
feudal labor she performs inside (the famous “double shift”)? If she does, how will her
physical and mental health be affected and likewise the qualities and quantities of her
household labor? If she does not, will she reduce her necessary and/or her surplus
household labor, and with what consequences for the reproduction of the feudal
household, for child care, and so on?
In summary, the relationship between traditional feudal households and capitalism
is contradictory. Household feudalism simultaneously supports and undermines
enterprise capitalism. When husbands sell their labor power to capitalist enterprises (and
indeed when their wives do as well), they spend their wages partly to create and maintain
their households. In this way, enterprise capitalism supports household feudalism. At the
same time, using part of their wages in this way threatens capitalism by undermining the
reproduction of the labor power that capitalist enterprises must buy and on which they
depend to produce and appropriate the surplus (generating their profits). Likewise, when
household feudal class structures generate surpluses used in part for husbands’ and
wives’ personal consumption (helping them to reproduce the labor power they sell
externally), it is household feudalism that supports enterprise capitalism. At the same
time, using household feudal surpluses in that way makes them unavailable to secure the
conditions of existence of household feudalism, thereby undermining it. Given that the
class structures of households and enterprises are interdependent, undermining either
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threatens the other. Moreover class structures are interdependent with all the other
structures inside households and enterprises (political structures, cultural structures, and
so on). Thus, our focused examination of the class contradictions between households
and enterprises yields a new vantage point for social analysis and new insights into the
contemporary problems and dynamics of both social sites.
We may illustrate the contradictions between household and enterprise class
structures by examining the recent wage depression in the US. Since the mid 1970s, US
workers have endured by far the worst three decades of real wage changes in the nation’s
history (at least since the 1820s). In most of the last thirty years, real wages fell; across
the period as a whole, average real wages stagnated at best. Meanwhile, labor
productivity rose rapidly, inside and outside the US, thereby dropping the prices of
domestically produced and imported consumer goods. Money wages could be lowered in
a variety of ways (outright cuts, shifts from full-time to part-time “temp” designations,
restructuring job descriptions, etc.) partly because falling consumer goods prices
cushioned the impact of falling money wages. Likewise, actual and potential outsourcing
of US jobs, especially to Asia, and a ceaseless drumbeat of threats regarding the
imperative “need” to cut wages to “protect jobs from leaving” had their impacts. US
workers, inside and outside of unions, fearfully accepted the falling money wages
(consoling themselves with lower prices in proliferating Wal-Marts and other discount
stores). But most workers sank further under they weight of rightwing ideological
hegemony and also accepted falling real wages alongside the work-place pressures that
yielded rising labor productivity.
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In Marxian terms, US capitalism thus succeeded in its most beloved of
combinations over the last thirty years. The value paid to workers dropped while the
value added by their labor rose.17 The quantity of surplus value appropriated by
capitalists thus exploded. Not surprisingly, the stock market bubbled (and burst) in the
usual hysteria of top corporate managers, shareholders, bankers, and others in positions to
tap the surplus value explosion. In the process, the inequalities of wealth, income,
political power and cultural access all widened significantly.
The centerpiece and source of capitalist success in the last twenty five years was
thus a rising rate of exploitation. The celebrants of that success, in business, government,
and academic circles, could not see, let alone consider, its exploitative foundation. They
spoke instead – and as always - about lean managements, entrepreneurship, and
marvelous new technologies. Such self-serving celebrations precluded any serious
examination – let alone class analysis - of rising exploitation’s social costs including
especially the resulting stress and strain placed on American households. To illustrate the
importance of what the celebrants missed and move our class analysis another step, we
propose here a brief class analysis of how the recently rising exploitation affected
households including children therein.
For the many millions of US male workers who suffered a falling value of their
labor power and of their real wages, they immediately confronted a personal as well as a
household crisis. They had to cut their own personal consumption – an additional
reduction in Ĉc (CAP) further jeopardizing the reproduction of their labor power – and/or
to demand more household-produced goods and services for their personal consumption
– a rise in CH thereby jeopardizing the reproduction of the household’s class structure.
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Under these pressures, workers’ households responded in two major ways. First, they
sent additional members of the household, chiefly wives, out to do additional wage work
to increase the household budget’s inflow of cash. At the same time, partly because
household budgets were so strained and partly because wives’ wage work imposed new
costs on those budgets, US households also responded by enormously increased
borrowing.
Wives newly earning wages provided desperately needed additional monetary
inflows to household budgets suffering from husbands’ falling wages.18 While this
solved some of the problems imposed on household class structures, it also introduced
new ones. On the one hand, wives’ wages helped households to secure the conditions of
existence of their internal class structures that required cash outlays (which included
rising interest payments on home mortgages/equity loans and credit card debt). In this
way, wives’ additional wages offset the impact on household budgets of husbands’
reduced wages. Likewise, wives’ wages could finance husbands’ additional personal
consumption as compensation for husbands contributing portions of their wages to
household budgets. However, wives’ wages spent in these ways were unavailable to
reproduce the labor power wives now sold to employers. That introduced new strains on
marriages and households.
However wives’ wages were spent, their wage labor introduced extraordinary
extra burdens on them. If they maintained unchanged their household labor, necessary
and surplus, and thereby their labor contributions to reproducing the household’s class
structure, it meant that their wage work reduced their free time (“R” from our earlier
equation and the “double shift” exposed by feminist writers across the last 30 years).19
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The wives’ resulting physical and emotional exhaustion threatened the reproduction of
household class structures and the reproduction of the wives’ newly marketed labor
power. Such threats then spilled over to affect the husbands and children in ways that
could and often did aggravate intra-family tensions that sometimes culminated in abuses
(spousal, child, substance, etc.) and/or divorces that drew increased public attention
across the last quarter century.
An alternative, as noted above, was for the wives not to continue their internal
household labor undiminished after they added external wage labor. Less household labor
would assuage wives’ exhaustion, but it, too, introduced its own problems. If wives
performed less necessary household labor, they thereby jeopardized the reproduction of
the labor power they devoted to household work. If wives performed less household
surplus labor, they thereby jeopardized the surplus available to reproduce the household’s
class structure and/or to compensate the husband for the portion of his wages not used for
his own consumption. Either option or any combination thereof would likely reduce the
flow of values to sustain children, thereby threatening their physical and emotional
development. It might also place new cash demands on the household budget, e.g. for
purchased housecleaning and/or childcare services in lieu of the wife’s housework.
Finally, husbands often accepted their wives’ entry into wage labor and their
resulting needs to use a portion of their earnings to reproduce the labor power they sell to
their employers. However, that usage of a portion of her earnings was often conceived as
a “gift” from husband to wife for her consumption. In class terms such “gifts” represent
rather the unconscious recognition that the household’s survival requires the reproduction
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of all its income-generating activities: the wife’s no less than the husband’s labor power
sold to external employers as well as the wife’s household surplus production.
These evolving class contradictions plunged millions of American women into
extremely difficult personal situations. Wage labor outside the household represented for
many a significant advance (variously conceptualized as “independence,” “maturity,”
“equality,” or “liberation”). Yet it also often meant increased stress and exhaustion,
greater household exploitation, an irritating new dependence on husbands’ “gifts”, and
enhanced anxieties over the accumulating household debts. Overstressed intra-household
relations surfaced as intense feelings of guilt (over “time away from home” or “too little
quality time with the kids”) or conflict (“the impossibility of combining career with
family”) or animosity (“the spouse that does not understand” and “the kids/parents that
seem so alien”). The households’ class dimensions and contradictions – in the surplus
definition of class utilized here - remained unknown. Because class consciousness was
mostly absent, Americans deployed non-class conceptualizations to express, account for,
and respond to the problems and crises of US households. Because they could not “see”
(theorize) class, they could not consider, let alone advocate, class changes in enterprises
and/or households as parts of possible solutions to those problems and crises.
Thus we confront the contemporary “dysfunctional family” ubiquitously
displayed across the culture but never subjected to any class-qua-surplus analysis. On
television and in films, household problems became ubiquitous themes for comedy and
occasional objects for “psychological” explanations. Endless sermonizing advocated a
return to idealized “family values” lost with traditional religion’s decline. Depression,
obesity, and substance abuse have become endemic and serve often to “explain”
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household problems and crises. The same applies to alienation between parents and
children, husbands and wives, and among the rising number of single people (expressed
in extreme personal difficulties with intimacy and trust). Yet the dominant cultural
themes, while often recognizing something profoundly amiss in American households
and family life, nonetheless stay clear of class analyses in general. The wide and deep
repression of concepts of class in surplus terms keeps class changes in households and/or
enterprises off the agendas for change, let alone action, in both popular and academic
discourses on America’s problems and their possible solutions.
As US households tried to cope with falling real wages by having wives enter the
wage labor force, enterprises producing child care and house cleaning as commodities
grew quickly. Every city and its suburbs display a growing array of childcare providers
including day-care enterprises, nursery schools, after-school centers, hired nannies, near
and extended family members, and neighborhood baby sitters. With the partial exception
of family members, these diverse providers produce and sell child care as a commodity.
Their enterprises display class structures ranging from the large to the small capitalist to
the self-employed (what Marx called “ancient”). Equally dramatic has been the growth in
small capitalist and ancient house cleaners. Given the relatively small capital and limited
skills required and the low level of government regulation or oversight, housecleaning
enterprises often employ illegal immigrants and especially young women.20
Women’s wages are, on average, lower than men’s. Child care and house cleaning
are often costly service commodities. These two circumstances add troubling
complexities to the household-enterprise nexus. When feudal households respond to
falling husband’s wages by then sending wives out to wage work, new problems arise
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when households must then purchase childcare and housecleaning services. A painful
question imposes itself on the family and especially on the wife. How large will the net
cash inflow be after subtracting childcare and housecleaning purchases from wives’
disposable (i.e. after tax and other deductions) wage incomes? In almost all cases, the
question – regardless of the answer – diminishes the wife’s wage contribution to the
household budget and its overall viability as perceived by both husband and wife. And
yet, comparable questions and calculations are rarely applied to the husband, even though
both partners similarly straddle the same two class structures (capitalist enterprise and
feudal household). A consciousness of the two class structures and their interdependence
would yield a more balanced appreciation of this similarity as well as the key difference
inside the household where wife produces and husband appropriates the surplus.
So far we have assumed, to keep the analysis manageably simple, that the wife’s
household childcare and cleaning labors occur within the framework of a feudal class
process. When these services are instead purchased as commodities produced by others,
wives are freed from a considerable amount of household labor (since both child care and
cleaning are labor-intensive activities). They can reallocate the time freed from those
labors to R, “free time” (to offset the exhaustion from her wage labor), or to other forms
of work inside and/or outside the household. Thus, on the one hand, switching to the
purchase of child care and cleaning is a partial offset to the contradictions and crisis of
the household consequent upon falling wages as described above. Yet once again, this
partial offset introduces new contradictions and problems. For example, reducing or
eliminating the wife’s household childcare labor has its problematic consequences.
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Child rearing plays a major role inculcating women into a life of nurturing and
caring for the other. Supported as well by religion and the marriage contract, women and
men alike often define women’s nature as serving the family inside the household. Such
serving is also understood unconsciously to include the performance of surplus labor for
her husband (Fraad 2000, 74). In this sense, a wife’s child care comprises one of the
conditions of existence of household feudalism parallel to religious sermons about wifely
duties, the banker’s provision of a mortgage loan to buy the home, the state’s provision of
public services to homeowners, and so on.
Clearly, if women take jobs outside the home and that reduces or eliminate their
childcare work, the feudal household will be threatened unless, for example, childcare
services are purchased. However, even if substitute child care is purchased to replace the
work no longer done by the wage-earning wife, that raises new problems. First, husbands
and wives may incur new anxieties and guilt because of the further distance from their
children when paid child care is inserted into family life. Second, the wife’s reduced or
eliminated childcare activities undermine one pillar of the feudal household: a waning of
the conception of women as somehow inherently or naturally surplus performers for
husbands. Not the least of the contradictions playing themselves out inside the
contemporary American family is the rush of wives into the paid labor force to save their
households (which it partly does) combined with the way that the resulting switch to
purchased child care threatens their households (which it partly does). But, then again, it
requires a class consciousness and a class analysis to be able to see, let alone address,
such a contradiction.
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Fathers’ household labor
We may now turn to another issue not yet addressed in the growing class
analytical literature on households: the possibility that husbands, as well as wives,
perform labor inside households (Cameron 1996/97, 2000; Gibson 1992, 44). Suppose
that husbands, partly to offset the “double-shift” experienced by their wage-earning
wives, undertake various household production activities such as cleaning, shopping,
cooking and child care. From a class-analytic standpoint, such production activities must
be questioned to determine whether and what kind of class processes may occur with
them. In other words, do such husbands’ labors generate a surplus or not? If a surplus is
produced, who appropriates and distributes it, and how is all this organized (i.e., in what
particular kind of class structure does the husband’s household labor occur)? Answering
these questions for the husband’s household labor will replicate the class analysis already
undertaken for the feudal wife’s household labor.
One possibility is that unlike the household labor of his wife the husband’s
household labor entails no surplus production; it is not divisible into necessary and
surplus components.21 He produces goods and services with or without household means
of production and then distributes the output to himself and/or others as gifts. The
following equation expresses such a husband’s utilization of his 24-hour day:
6.

24 = NL (CAP) + SL (CAP) + Z (NC) + R

where NL (CAP) and SL (CAP) stand respectively for the necessary and surplus labor
time spent on his capitalist job; Z (NC) time spent on these new household duties (the
letters NC signify non-class, i.e., the husband’s labor generates no surplus), and, as
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before, R the residual non-laboring time spent sleeping, eating, contemplating, and so
forth.
If no class process occurs with the husband’s household labor, his Z (NC) yields
produced wealth (goods and services) that he distributes among household members as a
gift. Assuming no change in the length of the husband’s capitalist work day, for him to
begin or increase Z (NC) requires him to reduce his R. On the one hand, beginning or
increasing Z (NC) provides the household with additional wealth, while on the other it
deprives the husband of non-labor time and the activities such time allowed. The specific
historical and social conditions that combine to influence husbands to begin or increase Z
(NC) will also shape what specific forms the resulting wealth takes (which goods and
services husbands will produce), how the wealth is distributed, and how the husband’s
production and distribution of that wealth impact the household and the larger society.
In this context, we may consider why husbands in the US undertook household
labor increasingly since the 1970s. The secular decline in most husbands’ real wages and
the resulting need for their wives to enter into the capitalist labor force pressured
husbands to perform (or perform more) household labor. Initially wives had simply added
their wage labor outside the home to their necessary and surplus labor inside. But the
resulting exhaustion and interpersonal strains changed expectations, needs, and demands.
Gradually, husbands and wives changed their household division of labor. Wives
continued to perform necessary and surplus labor within the household’s feudal class
structure but less of such labor than before. Husbands, especially on weekends, undertook
some or more heavy cleaning, yard work, household repairs, and child care. Of course,
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social – and above all, cultural circumstances - determined the specifics differentiating
each household (how much of what kind of labor husbands performed when).
In many of those households, we find no reason to conceive of the husband’s
labor as generating any surplus. In other words, the social context for such husbands’
household labor prevented any class process from occurring with that labor. That context
– for example, the relevant laws, religious commitments, conceptions of marriage, and so
on – had not much changed even while one particular internal aspect of household life
had changed significantly, namely the husband’s work. Thus most wives continued in
their feudal class position although sometimes tempered by some reduction of their total
household labor time. The husband’s household labor then functioned as a kind of act of
generosity or “commitment” to the family – above and beyond the wage income he
brought in - producing goods and services he distributed for the household’s “needs.” No
surplus was produced by or appropriated from such a husband’s household labor; that
labor and its products were simply adjuncts to the household’s feudal class structure.
We underscore this possibility for two reasons. First, by showing how husbands’
household work can take either non-class or, as we shall show next, class forms, we can
advance beyond analyzing merely the varying quantities of household labor husbands
perform. As we shall show, those forms are at least as consequential for households and
society as is the quantity of husbands’ labor. Second, non-class labor by an appropriator
of other people’s surplus labor is a possible feature alongside all class structures. For
example, consider the possible response by a feudal lord in medieval Europe when his
manor is threatened by some economic, political, or cultural crisis. With appropriate
fanfare, he may well have pitched in and worked alongside his serfs to, say, rebuild

41

ramparts or gather supplies to withstand siege. His labor in such circumstances need not
have entailed production of any surplus; it could simply have yielded goods or services
distributed by him as he and/or the church saw fit. Such a medieval feudal lord’s labor
was not surplus-producing, whereas his serf’s labor was. The same sort of analysis may
apply when a modern husband performs labor inside a feudal class-structured household.
He appropriates his wife’s feudal surplus whether or not he also performs labor as a nonclass adjunct to his wife’s performance of necessary and surplus labor.
Indeed, we may extend this analysis to other class structures and other social sites.
For example, consider a productive wage-worker in a capitalist enterprise who sketches,
during lunch breaks, and then distributes her drawings to fellow workers or keeps them or
gives them to family and friends. The labor of drawing entails no surplus; it does not
occur together with a class process. Her sketching labor is rather an adjunct to the
enterprise’s capitalist class structure. Whether this worker sketches (or not) is separate
from her position as a surplus producer within the enterprise’s capitalist class structure.
Likewise when workers and capitalists together clean up a ghetto neighborhood as a
Sunday charity project, their labor yields goods and services distributed to other
neighborhood individuals, but no class process occurs together with their labor.
While household labor by a husband may thus not exhibit any class dimension – it
generates no surplus itself – its commencement or increase may variously impact the
household’s feudal class structure as well as class structures outside the household. If and
when a husband begins or increases household labor without reducing his wage labor
outside the household – he will have to reduce his R, his non-laboring time. Such a
reduction in R may, for example, damage the reproduction of the labor power he sells to
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employers. In an alternative example, the husbands’ household labor can affect the
household’s feudal class structure. The production and distribution of the husband’s
output within the household may enable reductions of the feudal wife’s necessary and/or
surplus labors. She would benefit from such reductions, gaining some R, namely more
time for rest and other non-labor activities (with all the complex consequences of that on
the household). However, such reductions presume that some portion of the husband’s
household labor’s output is distributed either to her for consumption (to offset her
reduced necessary labor) or to himself for consumption (to offset her reduced surplus
labor). Of course, such distributions and offsets are possible, not necessary consequences
of husbands’ household work. With distributions of the husband’s household output for
alternative purposes, the husband’s household labor might leave the dimensions of the
household’s feudal class structure largely unchanged.
Still other possibilities include a rise in the rate of feudal exploitation of wives
flowing from their husbands’ undertaking or increasing their own, non-class household
labor. This might result from the following two-step scenario: first, a husband’s extra
household work supports his elderly parents newly entered into the household, and
second, with or without demands from the exhausted husband, his feudal wife delivers
more surplus to him out of feelings of guilt, admiration, love or combinations thereof
(without, of course, consciousness of the class dimensions of her activity). The complex
feelings generated in husbands and wives by the conditions and contradictions of their
households, marriages, and labor activities yield a range of alternative reactions to any
changes. We encountered a similarly wide range of possible reactions earlier in
examining the possible household consequences of a fall in men’s money wages.
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We turn now to examine how, why, and with what consequences husbands’
household labor may occur together with class processes. That is, we consider the
circumstances under which husbands perform surplus labor inside their households
(typically in addition to doing so in enterprises outside). Within a feudal household, the
husband may, for example, produce a surplus working as a serf alongside his wife doing
likewise. In this case, his work contains a necessary and a surplus labor component – like
hers – and he is the appropriator of his own as well as her surplus. This is parallel to a
capitalist spending part of his week working just like and alongside his productive
employees and then appropriating the surplus value embodied in the commodities they
and he have together produced. It is also conceivable, although admittedly rare, for the
husband and wife to divide the different kinds of household labor (e.g. cooking, cleaning,
etc.) between them such that the wife is serf and the husband lord in some kinds, whereas
their class positions are reversed in other kinds.
However, we think it unlikely in the US for husbands to produce feudal surpluses
for their wives. It is true that women are no longer tied by custom, tradition, and
economics to work only inside households, increasingly take wage-labor positions
outside, and enjoy greater personal freedoms and less social inequality vis-à-vis men.
However, the still dominant cultural norms mark women, and not men, as household
serfs. Women’s labors inside households remain a basic part of their identities and
definitions as workers, whereas for men household labor remains incidental and
tangential to their identities as workers outside households. The latter remain much more
places where women – whether or not they also hold wage labor positions – rather than
men perform necessary labor in the sense of reproducing their labor power. In
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comparison, men mostly buy the means of reproducing their labor power, viewing their
household labor as secondary, minor, and a gracious gift to wife and family. Likewise,
the raw statistics of time and energy spent on household tasks reinforces the tangential
quality of husbands’ household labor; the women continue to do the overwhelming bulk
of household work.
It would require drastically different cultural and political conditions than
currently exist in the US for husbands to perform necessary and surplus labor inside
households within a feudal class structure, as their wives do. The traditions and rules of
marriage, like the other norms, customs, and expectations of most contemporary
societies, still place the primary responsibilities for housework and particularly child care
on women in the vast majority of households. Women either accept or endure those
responsibilities, perhaps asking husbands for “some help.” Despite advances over recent
decades in women’s rights to control their bodies and gain wages comparable to men’s,
most religious leaders still endorse women’s identification in terms of house and home
far more than men’s. God is asserted to have bestowed on women, not men, the nurturing
gene. Husbands and wives still believe in large numbers that their marriage vows and
their love entail (as well as require) that wives must perform surplus labor inside the
household’s feudal class structure. Women thus mostly still “choose” to marry, raise
children, and deliver the fruit of their household surplus labor to their husbands. They
prepare meals for themselves but also spend the extra labor time preparing meals for their
husbands; they wash their own and their husbands’ clothing; they make their and their
husbands’ sides of the bed. What household labor husbands may “generously” undertake
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is thus very differently understood and differently organized, chiefly we think in the nonclass way discussed above.
However, there are some exceptions to the dominant patterns of husbands’ doing
either no household labor or some limited non-class labor within their households.
Husbands’ household labor could sometimes occur within one of two other household
class structures. The first of these – and much the more frequently encountered - is
Marx’s “ancient” class structure; the second kind of household class structure in which
husbands could work is – in what we, following Marx, have termed - the communist class
structure.
Movements such as women’s liberation sometimes and in some places interacted
with socio-economic shifts to induce women and men to establish marriages and
households built upon shared commitments to substantial gender equality. In them, wives
were entitled to earn wages in jobs outside the household. Husbands were obligated to
share the housework (including child care) on a roughly equal basis with their wives.
Such equality-focused households displayed an ancient class structure in which husband
and wife were “ancient partners.”22 Wives in ancient households no longer perform any
surplus for their husbands (as in feudal households). Instead, both women and men
become partnered household workers performing tasks according to an implicit or
explicit division of household labor between them. Each partner performs a roughly equal
share of the necessary labor of preparing meals, cleaning, washing clothes, and so forth to
reproduce their individual (ancient) household labor power. Each then also performs a
surplus above and beyond that necessary labor and each alone appropriates his/her own
surplus labor’s product. They work out some method of distributing their respective
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surpluses to secure the conditions of existence of their household’s ancient class
structure.23
A specific social context is needed to enable this kind of self-appropriating class
structure to exist in households. Men and women must somehow have come to feel
strongly that no marriage rule or custom is acceptable that obligates either of them to
perform any (surplus) labor for the other’s benefit. Given the prevalence of social
conditions and norms entwining women in feudal household arrangements, some social
space of dissent from and resistance to those norms would have had to exist. Women and
men would have required such a space to conceive of households as partnerships of equal
individual laborers (performing physical and emotional tasks) where neither “bosses” the
other. Were class consciousness part of such husbands’ and wives’ self awareness, they
might describe their households as sites where two self-appropriators of their own
surpluses chose to cohabit and build a family around that particular class structure.
Husbands’ household labors may take a class form other than the above described
ancient partnership. This occurs if husband and wife undertake household labor together
as a fully shared activity, collectively producing, appropriating, and distributing the
surpluses produced inside their households. They may do this as a couple or possibly
integrate others (relatives, friends, and housemates) into such a communist household.
What distinguishes its class structure from the ancient is its collectivity. In an ancient
household class structure, two individual producers who individually appropriate their
individual surpluses work out a partnership household. In a communist household class
structure, the collective of laboring household members (two or more) produce,
appropriate and distribute their surpluses collectively.
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For the communist class structure to exist within households, its conditions of
existence must be in place within the larger social context. That is, the politics, culture
and economics of some portion of the society would have to determine in women and
men the desire and the demand for equality and community inside households (rather
than feudal subordination or ancient individuality). Such wives and husbands would
reject those aspects of the larger society that pressed women to serve men unilaterally in
marriage and home. Similarly, such men and women would find households organized
around the ancient class structure producer unattractive and unacceptable because they
would associate it with lonely self-interest and self-absorbing behavior.
Women and men forming communist class structured households would reflect as
well as advance ways of thinking that celebrate collectivity at home and perhaps even in
society more generally. To sustain collective production, appropriation, and distribution
of household surpluses, husbands and wives would likely establish as well collective
means of wielding power inside the communist class structured household. That is, the
distribution of authority between and among adults and children there would take on
collective and egalitarian dimensions unlike the lordly authority typically arrogated to
feudal husbands or the individually separated powers of the ancient household. Similarly
collective and egalitarian processes of producing and disseminating meanings (i.e.,
cultural processes) inside the household (religious, educational, artistic, and so on) would
likewise reflect and reinforce a communist class structure there. Indeed, the social space
for and existence of such political and cultural processes would be prerequisites for the
existence of communist class structures inside households. Wives and husbands could
and would collectively produce, appropriate and distribute household surpluses only if
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the larger society made such behavior conceivable, desirable, and operational in some
form and also preferable to alternative household class structures for some members of
that society.24 Finally, the communist class structured household may include household
laborers who also engaged in earning money incomes outside the household. If so – and
quite like the parallel situation in feudal and ancient class structured households – the
communist class structured household would exhibit a budget that combines monetized
and non-monetized revenues and expenditures to reproduce the multiple, various class
structures its adults engage.

When children become household serfs
Having assumed to this point that children are not able or not required to perform
significant household labor, we may now relax that assumption. In this way we may
extend some initial explorations by others likewise interested in the consequences of
children’s labor for households and their class structures (Fraad 2000, 74-76; Safri 2005,
chap. 2). In households containing feudal class structures, children are typically
integrated, once they begin to perform labor, as additional household serfs. They thus
come to resemble, rather closely, the organization often found in medieval European
feudalism. Such children are tied by familial and legal arrangements to an exploiting
father – head of the feudal household - who appropriates the surplus produced by the
household’s children. Culture, law, religion, and so on intervene to bestow on the fathers
the considerable power (which he may delegate) to order children’s behavior including
their household surplus labor. Also parallel to European feudalism, the fathers and
mothers of such children are morally and legally obliged to care for and protect them.
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Finally, these social forces also influence children to accept and obey the orders,
decisions, and wishes of “the father” (or any others to whom the father may delegate such
authority). The children will often find it “normal and natural” that a certain age brings an
obligation for them to “share” the housework (likely with no more consciousness of its
class – surplus – aspects than their parents possess). That most children eventually chafe
and often rebel against their feudal households reflects in part the constraints of early
childhood, the difficult transition to feudal serfdom as they grow older, and the mix of
resentment and guilt in their reactions.
Children’s household serfdom displays three major variant forms. In one, the
father continues to receive the wife’s surplus while adding the appropriation of surpluses
produced by the children. In a second arrangement, while the wife continues to perform
surplus for her husband, she assumes a surplus appropriating role in relation to working
children. As in medieval Europe, serfs can also have serfs. In a third possible form of
children’s household feudal class position, both parents share the surplus-appropriating
position, a kind of collective appropriation of their children’s surplus. In all three of these
forms, children do variable kinds and quantities of necessary and surplus labor: cleaning
their rooms and clothes, preparing their meals, shopping, household repairs, and the like.
Such children thus shift from being the objects of (mostly women’s) surplus labor in the
form of child care and become subjects performing surplus labor: a specifically class
dimension of children’s “growing up.”

Children’s feudal exploitation inside households exercises varying impacts. It
may simply be additive to the wife’s and so yield a rising mass of in-kind surplus for the
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father. Had he been doing some household labor, the opportunity to appropriate his
children’s surplus might allow him to reduce or eliminate his own household labor and
thereby realized an expanded free time (R). Alternatively, such a father might utilize his
children’s surplus to reproduce the labor power he sells to an employer outside the
household. In this way, children’s serfdom adds still another layer of complexity to
struggles over the household budget. As we have already shown, the household budget
can often entail diversions of the husband’s wage income from purchasing commodities
to reproduce his own labor power to, for example, expenditures to care for young
children. This can threaten that wage income. Yet that same child care can eventuate in
children’s surplus labor later that the father can consume to reproduce or enhance the
labor power he sells outside the household. In short, here is yet another way that children
interact with their feudal households in contradictory ways, variously undermining yet
also strengthening them.
Children’s surplus labor could impact feudal households differently were the wife
to appropriate that surplus. Suppose the older children’s surplus labor yields roughly the
same bundle of goods and services as the wife’s necessary and surplus labor. The father
could then continue to receive an undiminished quantity of surplus, if the wife transferred
to him the children’s household surplus. The wife might then herself consume her own
household surplus, thereby freeing herself from household feudalism. In this stark
example, she substitutes the feudal exploitation of her children for her own. That
substitution might be difficult to rationalize or legitimate if conceptualized in terms of the
burden of labor, let alone in terms of class. Children’s work and exploitation might then
seem a heavy price to pay for a wife’s liberation from those burdens. A much more
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appealing (to parents) conceptualization would construe all this quite differently, as a
matter of helping children to mature into responsible adults by undertaking instructive
and constructive household chores. Wives especially might thus insist on children’s
attendance at churches where authoritative clergy can reiterate such an appealing
conceptualization as perhaps biblical in origin and power.
Another possible impact of children producing household surpluses for the wife
rather than the husband might involve the wife continuing to produce surplus for the
husband. Not only would the serf wife than have serfs of her own, but the two layers of
serfdom would differ in their household power positions but not in their household class
positions. Children and their mothers would then both be feudal serfs, but their mothers
would have much the greater power and status within the household. Arresting parallels
with medieval Europe suggest themselves. Feudal manors often displayed layers of more
and less powerful serfs and serfs of serfs. Additionally, a lord might place a trusted serf
in a managerial position over less trusted serfs only to find the trusted serf slowly
transforming such management into the very different position of him appropriating the
surplus of those he manages. Likewise, the feudal husband may trust his wife to manage
the children’s household labors only to discover that she may have altered the situation to
become herself the direct appropriator of the children’s household surplus. Both feudal
household wife and medieval serf could continue to produce surpluses for their husband
and their manorial lord, even as they appropriated the surpluses of the children and lesser
serfs below them in their respective feudal hierarchies.
When children perform household surplus that is appropriated by both parents
conjointly, the impact of the children’s labor may well be different. For example, this
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arrangement may emerge as a kind of compensation for a feudal wife: while she is serf to
her husband they are equal appropriators of their children’s surplus. Conjoint parental
appropriation of children’s surplus labor may also reflect the difficulty of either parent
accomplishing such appropriation alone. Then children’s household exploitation can
function as a kind of cement for the parents’ relationship. In households with non-feudal
class structures, such conjoint appropriation of their children’s surplus could have yet
other impacts. For example, in ancient or communist class structured households, the
transition of young children into children doing household work need not necessarily be
accompanied by the integration of those children into the parent’s household class
structure.25 Parents might then occupy one class position in relation to their children and
a different class position in relation to one another: within households where the adults
function within ancient or communist class structures, they might organize the children
that reach a working age into a feudal class structure as their serfs. The parents might
then conjointly appropriate their children’s surpluses, even as their class connection to
one another is either ancient or communist. Just as parents differentiate their
interpersonal connection from their relationship to their children – in, say, their financial
or sexual or power dimensions – so too can they structure the class relation of husband to
wife very differently from that of children to parents. Of course, given the likely absence
of class consciousness in the parents, they are unlikely to be conscious of a different class
relation to their children. Instead, they may justify their children’s feudal serfdom as
required by their age, immaturity, lack of experience, education, hormones, lack of good
judgment, and so forth.
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We have hardly exhausted the complexity of class relationships among children
and parents or the range of their possible impacts. We have not, for example, devoted
attention to such possibilities as children exploiting their parents or one another.26 Nor
have we examined the subsumed class positions inside households: the positions of
people who neither produce nor appropriate surpluses but rather provide the conditions of
existence for the production and appropriation of the surplus. What we have elsewhere
elaborated about subsumed classes in relation to capitalist enterprises can be readily
extended to the class analysis of households (Resnick and Wolff 1987, Chapters 3 and 4).
Thus, for example, a manager in a capitalist manufacturing enterprise is neither a surplus
producer nor an appropriator; he/she rather provides the supervision of personnel or the
purchasing of inputs or the sales of outputs that are all conditions required for surplus to
be produced within the enterprise. Because such managers are paid via distributions to
them of portions of the surplus appropriated by the enterprise’s board of directors, they
occupy capitalist subsumed class positions. By direct analogy, management of children’s
household labor may be a condition for surplus to be produced by them. Perhaps the wife
will need to manage and so receive a portion of the household surplus for doing so. In
other words, a complete class analysis of households, as of any other social site where
class processes may occur, would need to include the subsumed classes. The latter
comprise the “enablers” of surplus production – rather than being either producers or
appropriators of household surpluses themselves - who get distributed shares of the
surplus. Households, like enterprises, display class structures that include both the
fundamental class processes (that define the performers and appropriators of the surplus)
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and the subsumed class processes (that define how the appropriators distribute the surplus
to those others whose activities “enable” the fundamental class process to continue).

Addendum: Households without class structures
Even our introductory analysis of the rich diversity of class structures that
households may contain must include at least a brief mention of households without any
class processes. We believe they are becoming more common in advanced capitalist
countries today, especially where women have moved quickly into full time paid
employment. Such households no longer display class processes because they are no
longer social sites where production occurs (or they are, at least, approaching such
conditions). Instead, such households have become sites almost exclusively of
consumption and not of labor.
Some historical examples of this phenomenon can help to clarify its theoretical
dimensions and implications. After 1917, the Bolsheviks debated the possibilities of a
vast social transformation that would eradicate the exploitative production arrangements
inside households and so liberate Soviet women (to join their husbands in wage labor and
also to free them for full social participation). In the course of the Soviet debates, the
focus was less on changing the class structures of households (say from feudal to
communist) and more on changing households from sites of production and consumption
to sites of only consumption. Some concrete steps were taken in the 1920s to realize such
changes (Resnick and Wolff 2002, chapter 7).
When little or no production occurs there, households likewise stop being sites of
surplus production, appropriation, and distribution. In short, as households lose their class
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structures, so wives and husbands no longer need to work or strive (consciously or
unconsciously) to reproduce those class structures. Their household budgets may become
simplified in so far as they lose their non-monetary components. Money incomes from
household members’ jobs outside the household (and perhaps also borrowings) become
the only revenue, and cash outlays (to buy commodities and perhaps service their debts)
become the only expenditures. Eliminating households as places of production (and
hence of class structures, tensions, and struggles) requires as well as furthers basic
changes in how men and women identify themselves and conceive of their relationships
to one another, to children, and to the larger economy and society.
In modern societies where capitalist class structures prevail in enterprises,
households may cease production to become places to which husbands and wives retreat
from the market and from their job. They retreat in order to consume there the
commodities they purchased to reproduce the labor power they sell to their employers.
For examples, instead of home-produced meals, they spend their wages to purchase storeprepared meals; instead of cleaning their homes and their clothes at home, they buy
house-cleaning, laundering, and dry-cleaning as service commodities; and instead of
caring for their children, they hire commercial childcare providers. Other comparable
examples include proliferating commercial personal shopper services, healthcare
providers, landscapers, repairers, security guards, and so on. Of course, affluence will
also play some role in determining how far each household can go in reducing household
production to consumption. However, at least inside the United States, abundant evidence
already shows that many households at all income levels have reduced production; their
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differing affluence affects rather the quality and costs of the commodities they all
purchase increasingly to replace household production. Among
Of course, in relatively few households, even in the United States, has production
been totally eliminated. Some work usually has still to be done inside the household even
when its members consume goods and services almost exclusively purchased from
producers outside the household. In many societies, much household production remains
the norm. Moreover, economic, political, and cultural shifts may well reverse the process
of substituting commodity consumption for household production where it has occurred.
Hence, despite the forces at work constricting household production, it remains a major
social site of production and of class around the world. It seems to us long overdue for
the sort of class analysis commenced here.
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Endnotes
1

As far as we know, one of the first attempts to theorize children in class as surplus terms was set forth by
Gibson-Graham (1996, 214).
2
When the property is used by productive capitalists – those in whose industrial enterprises productive
laborers generate surplus value – then the property-owning children’s incomes constitute subsumed class
revenues. Those revenues secure the provision of the children’s productive property to the industrial
capitalist for the latter’s use in appropriating surplus from productive laborers hired by that capitalist. The
children receive distributed portions of that surplus from the capitalist. If and when the children’s property
is used instead by unproductive capitalists such as merchants and bankers, then the children’s income is not
a surplus distributed by an appropriating capitalist, but is rather non-class revenue. The subsumed class vs.
non-class revenue sources for children underscores the different possible relationships between propertyowning children and class structures that include both productive and unproductive capitalist enterprises:
see Resnick and Wolff (1987) and Wolff and Resnick (1987) for discussions of productive vs. unproductive
capitalists.
3
In Marxian terms, the goods and services (use-values) received and consumed by the child can be
understood to also possess a “value” (without adjective) measurable by the socially necessary abstract labor
hours materialized in such use values.
4
The following illustrates what we mean by the two processes of labor and class operating within the
feudal household. The wife engages in a household labor process: L(F) x a = UVH where L(F) stands for
her total feudal labor performed, say, over a day, a for her labor productivity, and UVH the quantity of use
values – household wealth – produced per day, a product of her labor times its productivity. The Marxian
tradition often refers to or locates this labor process within the “forces of production.” The class process
refers to something very different. Over the same day, the wife also engages in a feudal class process:
LNL (F) x a = UVNL where her feudal necessary labor LNL (F) times its productivity, a, yields household
consumption to sustain her, UVNL. However, over that day she also labors above and beyond that necessary
labor performing surplus labor, LSL (F), yielding wealth, UVSL, for her husband: LSL (F) x a = UVSL. Her
class exploitation is measured either in surplus labor time, LSL (F), or its yield, UVSL. The same Marxian
tradition typically refers to this class process as the “relations of production.”
5
The assumption typically made in discussions of class exploitation is that necessary and surplus labor
takes the same concrete forms: for example, the wife produces, say, prepared meals and repaired clothes to
sustain her and additional quantities of the same items delivered to her husband. However, that assumption
is not necessary. A new mother within a feudal household may continue to perform necessary and surplus
labor in the concrete forms of meals (and washed clothes, cleaned space, etc.), while adding or substituting
a new concrete form of her surplus labor, namely child care. This situation parallels the typical
circumstance in the European medieval manorial economy when serfs performed necessary labor
producing one kind of crop on the land they had use of and surplus labor yielding a completely different
crop when working on the lord’s land. They sometimes produced no crop at all for the lord but rather
performed their surplus labor for him in the concrete forms of making or repairing his furniture or
providing childcare to his children. Class exploitation takes place in these examples – e.g., the performance
of a surplus labor over and beyond necessary – even though different concrete forms of wealth flow from
the performance of, respectively, necessary and surplus labor.
6
Partly because sexual services, like child care, are rarely analyzed within a class theoretic framework, and
partly because of certain parallels in wives’ resistance to increased exploitation within households’ feudal
class structures, we offer this brief class analysis. As with any other labor process – the use of brains and
muscles to produce a good or a service - sexual labor can be conceptualized as yielding a specific service,
namely sexual pleasure. Sexual labor need not, but it may occur together with a class process, i.e.
intertwined with the production and appropriation of surplus labor. Thus, for example, a wife in a feudal
class-structured household may have a sexual relationship with her husband such that she engages in sexual
labor not to provide sexual pleasure only to her but rather to provide sexual pleasure also to her husband,
while his sexual labor is not similarly focused in delivering a comparable surplus to her. That is, the quality
of the sexual relationship between wife and husband may entail exploitation. Then, such a wife might well
produce necessary household labor yielding prepared meals, cleaned rooms, etc. plus surplus labor yielding
those items and also sexual pleasure for her husband and also child care for resulting children. Indeed, from
this class perspective, the general question arises: how may feudal class processes (of producing,
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appropriating, and distributing surpluses), when they characterize household production, influence other
processes – cultural, sexual, emotional, etc. - inside those households?
7
Given the labor intensity of child care, we surmise that most wives will likely resist continuing to perform
other household labors – or at least try to perform them less intensively. Consciously or otherwise, they will
at least want – if not easily be able – to offer fewer meals, do less washing and cleaning, and provide fewer
sexual services, notwithstanding considerable guilt about such desires.
8
We will not here inquire into the problem of the initial money needed to establish feudal households. That
analysis is largely derivative of our text’s discussion of the monetary payments needed for an existing
feudal household to be reproduced.
9
Strictly speaking and for completeness we should include here monetary outlays to provide the tools,
equipment and raw materials to begin any new labor process assigned to the wife within a feudal class
structure inside the household. For example, when children arrive and the wife must add additional surplus
labor, money outlays will be needed to provide her with the requisite tools, equipment, and raw materials to
commence that surplus labor. These money outlays are different from those discussed in the text, namely
on-going outlays to replenish used up tools, equipment and raw materials. As noted earlier in the text, for
simplicity we will generally ignore outlays to begin or establish new household feudal labor; our focus will
be on the on-going replenishment outlays.
10
Other key demands that add their contribution to the right hand side of the equation and enhance the
inequality sign would be various kinds of taxes paid to the state, union dues, and workers’ savings. Along
with the household budget, they too contribute to the crisis experienced by the wage worker.
11
On this point, Marx in Capital vol. 1 offers two different formulations of what are included in the “sum
of means of subsistence” to reproduce workers’ labor power. In one, he theorizes the value of labor power
as equal to the “value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its owner” (Marx, 274).
Marx explains that those means of subsistence are required or necessary to enable the worker and the
worker alone in laboring to replace expended human muscle and brain. He goes on to explain how
society’s “historical and moral element” helps to shape the actual quantitative amount and qualitative
nature of those means of subsistence necessary to reproduce just the owner’s labor power (Marx, 275).
However, when Marx, on the same page, comes to discuss the mortality of the owner of labor power, he
offers a second and different theorization of the value of labor power. He does this by newly including in
those means of subsistence those necessary to support the worker’s children so that “this race of peculiar
commodity-owners may perpetuate its presence on the market” (Marx, 275). As far as we can determine, it
is one thing to specify a bundle of means of subsistence to reproduce only the owner’s sold labor power at a
point in and over time; it is quite another to add to that bundle an amount aimed at reproducing the same
owner’s children as potential suppliers of labor power. That owners of labor power have children, typically
within a family relationship, is, of course, relevant and requires further analysis. That the reproduction of
capitalism requires a continued source of sellers of labor power as one of its conditions of existence also is
relevant and needs analysis. Nonetheless, their pertinence and analytical attention do not warrant
introducing an inconsistency into the logic of the value analysis, whether by Marx or anyone else. The
inconsistency results from conflating the conditions required to reproduce no more than the workers’ sold
labor power as a commodity with the different conditions required to sustain a ready supply of future
workers. Instead, we suggest that the introduction of children (and family) be handled similarly to Marx’s
introduction of still other analytical categories of price of production, unproductive labor, and so forth.
Each new specification requires an extension and elaboration of the value analysis to include its presence
and consequences. That is what we intend here for the categories of children and family and that is what
inequality 2 portrays.
12
A parallel result holds for all other kinds of “leakages” from income received such as taxes to the state,
charitable donations, and savings. Similar to the impact of the household budget, each of these threatens the
reproduction of labor power by reducing the worker’s purchase of wage commodities. Each of these also
serves in its unique way to help strengthen the reproduction of labor power. Our focus here is only on the
contradictory nature of the household budget, but the analysis could be extended to show the conflicts
presented by other kinds of leakages as well.
13
While we wish here to stress how household feudalism can undermine enterprise capitalism, we do not
deny that household feudalism also supports capitalist class structures in enterprises. For example, caring
for children in feudal households may provide future suppliers of enhanced quantities and qualities of labor
power to capitalism. Budgets to support household feudalism also help to secure capitalism by expanding
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markets for its produced commodities. In any case – and this is the focus of our text – such diversions of
fathers’ wages have an immediate undercutting effect on the reproduction of their labor power and hence
on their roles in capitalist class structures. This immediate effect is what provokes the reaction of a
reorganization of household feudalism to compensate for and thereby offset the threatened reproduction of
the father’s labor power.
14
While the emergence of this world-view helped result in a stronger feudal household including better
protected and cared for children, we fully understand that these same households and children often face a
precarious existence. The numbers are well known: after only a few years of marriage some 50% of
marriages end in divorce or separation; too many children too often suffer physical and emotional abuse
within the home. Exploitation and class contradictions of the sort we elaborate here contribute to these sad
numbers.
15
Note also that the NCRM term in Equation 3 is equal to the YHB term in Equation 1. As noted in the text
earlier, the transfer entails the passage of a portion of the husband’s wages from his position in a capitalist
class structure (the enterprise) to his position as an appropriator of the wife’s feudal surplus (the
household); it is a value transfer between the two different class positions the husband occupies.
16
As suggested earlier, for simplicity of exposition we will here ignore the outlays for tools, equipment,
and raw materials used up in household production to concentrate on feudal subsumed class outlays. No
logical or theoretical problem arises if such replenishment outlays were to be added to the discussion in the
text.
17
Referring again to Marx’s “historical and moral element” entering into the determination of workers’
“necessary requirements,” that is, their real wage (Marx, 275), we think such a changed “element”
affecting workers’ real wages arose in the US after the 1970s and soon became hegemonic. Contributing to
this change was a theorization, formulated by neoclassical economists partly in opposition to the
dominance of Keynesian theorizations and policies and supported by the media, business, and the Reagan
political revolution, in which workers’ unions and union-won wages were responsible for much of the
internationally competitive difficulties faced by capitalist business at that time. In this world-view,
workers’ unions were portrayed as a “special interest group” that inflicted relatively high wages, archaic
work rules, and constrained productivity that together worked against America’s economic growth
including growing jobs for workers. That view combined with eroded union power (initiated in 1981 with
the Reagan offense against striking air controllers) and with dramatic changes in the labor market (a
relatively constrained expansion of demand because of a rising organic composition of capital, even as
labor supply rose dramatically because of a combination of rising legal but above all illegal immigration,
women entering the labor force, and restriction on the state as the employer of last instance) produced a
social environment in which workers’ lowered real wage became rational and unavoidable even to workers
themselves. Persuaded that their claimed high unit labor costs were the essential cause of business’ inability
to compete successfully with more efficient Japanese and German enterprises, workers, fearful of losing
their jobs, acquiesced and came to accept lower real wages as a long run solution.
18

While an important contributing cause, men’s depressed wages were hardly the only reason for women
entering the labor force. The culture in the land had changed to a view in which women were to balance the
competing demands of career and family rather than – what it was for so long – managing only a home for
their husbands and children. Whereas married women’s mass participation in the labor force was once
considered unusual, save for death of their husband or war, now the norm became participation in the work
force when married and even when children arrived. Further, a long and relatively successful struggle for
women’s rights not only gave women power to make decisions over their bodies including the right to
place it in the workplace, but also helped to give rise to a more inviting, less discriminating, and, in
penalizing sexual harassment, a safer workplace for them. Laws thus changed making it that much easier to
leave the household, compete with men for work and promotion, and narrow the gap between what they
and men earned for comparable work.
19
The impact on women’s R may vary directly with their position outside households. For example,
women who occupy subsumed class managerial positions in capitalist enterprises often are required to
work longer hours than do women who occupy positions as productive laborers there. Hence the resulting
stress on their households from their pinched R can be more severe, even though compared to women who
occupy positions of productive laborers they are not exploited and receive higher incomes.
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20

Of course, many of these young women are also wives inside households that share many of the class and
non-class contradictions depicted in the preceding text. See the dissertation by Safri (2005) for an analysis
of immigrant households.
21
Many labor activities in all societies occur without the accompaniment of any class process (i.e. without
the production of any surplus). For example, an individual walking through a forest collecting pieces of
wood, carving them into birds, and distributing them to children is certainly engaged in labor (using brains
and muscles to transform objects found in nature into consumable products). However, no surplus is
produced or distributed; the labor process occurs but not together with any class process. Other examples
include many other kinds of artistic productions, the preparation of an occasional sandwich for oneself,
family or friends; helping a neighbor clean a garage; reading a story to help children fall asleep, and so on.
Of course, every one of these examples could, in other social circumstances, occur with a class process;
that is they could occur such that a surplus is produced, appropriated, and distributed in some way. Our
point here is only to register – and explore the significant implications of – the two possibilities: that a
particular labor process may or may note occur together with a class process.
22
As far as we know, the term “ancient partnership” was first coined and applied analytically by Satya
Gabriel (1990); we gratefully acknowledge our debt to him for this very useful concept. Child care and
children and much else too would be affected by the existence of or a change from a feudal to an ancient
class structure. For example, no longer would women be associated with and responsible for much if not all
of childcare obligations as occurs in the traditional feudal home.
23
Such an ancient class-structured household will also develop a household budget that parallels the budget
analyzed above in the case of the feudal household. Thus, the ancient partnership household’s budget will
have revenues that combine the monetized income from husband’s and/or wife’s wage work outside the
household with the in-kind products of their household labors. That budget’s expenditures will likewise
combine monetized and non-monetized outlays including those aimed to secure both the external wage
income (likely from occupying one or another capitalist class position) of husband and/or wife and their
“partnered” ancient class positions within the household.
24
Because we think the typical household is still organized in the traditional, feudal way, save for at least
some men there offering their labor but without participating in any class process, we think combinations of
class structures existing in the same household while feasible also to be rare. For example, we think it
unlikely that a traditional feudal home in which women perform surplus for men will co-exist with an
ancient in which men perform surplus only for themselves or with a communist in which they also
appropriate surplus collectively.
25
In fact, a similar situation likely existed in some Native American tribes. Where their class structures
were communist (Amariglio 1984, ch. 3), they sometimes integrated captured “outsiders” as slaves (i.e. in a
slave class relation) rather than as sharing the same communist class relationship as themselves.
26
There are problems with both possibilities. To theorize children as surplus receivers requires specifying
those social processes that could place them in a position to receive a surplus produced by others. Before
children reach a minimum age, it is difficult to see how they might distribute a surplus they appropriate to
secure such social processes (and it is difficult to see how those social processes might be secured without
surplus distributions). Similarly, if surplus-appropriating children needed to make monetized payments
outside the household, where could they secure the cash without money incomes of their own? To argue
that conditions of existence for children appropriating household surpluses might all be internal and thus
non-monetized might be possible, but such an argument stretches credulity.
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